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Recent Supreme Court decisions on regulatory takings12 consti-
tute a shift from per se categorical tests to the ad hoc balancing test of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York3 and to an ex-
plicit recognition that the area of regulatory takings is so complex
that no substantive rule is possible.  This shift has occurred despite
criticism that the Penn Central approach is so vague that it does not
provide predictable results.4 Even if the results are not predictable,
there is reason to think judicial balancing of substantive values is fair.5
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
** J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 2003.
*** J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 2003.
**** J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 2003.
1. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation."  U.S.
CONST. amend. V.  This "'Just Compensation Clause' . . . applies to the States as well as the
Federal Government" and applies not only to physical appropriation of land for public use but
also to "regulatory takings", that is, regulatory prohibitions on use that go so far as to require
compensation.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307
n.1, 326 n.21 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001).  See infra notes 45-133 and accompanying text for further discussion of these cases.
3. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme
Court Been Competent in its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB.
LAW. 307, 312-20 (1998).
5. See infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.  For
arguments that the fairness of the process validates the Penn Central approach see F. Patrick
Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad
Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 471-479, 513-518 (2001); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1629 (1988) ("[B]alancing—or, better, the judicial practice of situated
judgment or practical reason—is  not law's antithesis but a part of law's essence.").
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Nevertheless, even if a procedure appears fair, there is always the
possibility that it is not, in fact, fair in application.  Determining
whether the application is fair is, of course, difficult because there is
no substantive standard for identifying regulatory takings.  However,
even though we lack a standard of what the results should be, we may
have a standard of what the results should not be.  For example, if
owners never prevail under the Penn Central test, there is a serious
possibility that the process is so unfair that it is, in effect, a sham.  In
other words, no matter how carefully we construct a model of proce-
dural fairness, “we cannot simply assume that the model works as in-
tended; we must critique its performance in terms of its results.”6
The evaluation of the results under the Penn Central approach is
not a simple matter.  The test is, at least, not an obvious sham; owners
have prevailed in some cases.7 However, showing at least some victo-
ries for owners is a weak defense of the fairness of the results under
the Penn Central approach.  A stronger defense would address harder
questions, such as: How often do owners succeed?  Is this rate of suc-
cess sufficient to conclude that the process is fair in terms of the
treatment of owners vis a vis regulators?  Does the process take too
long?
This article will address these harder questions.  Part I of the ar-
ticle summarizes the Penn Central approach and the Supreme Court’s
recent recommitment to the approach.  Part II discusses the results of
a survey of cases citing Penn Central.  This discussion focuses on the
questions of how often owners litigate and prevail under the Penn
Central test, how long the process takes, and to what extent, if any,
the results of the survey support the fairness of the process approach
of Penn Central.
I.  THE PENN CENTRAL AD HOC BALANCING APPROACH
A. Penn Central
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court openly disavowed any explicit
test or standard for determining when a regulatory taking occurs.
6. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 338 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
improper racial patterns in imposing the death penalty indicate that an apparently fair process
for imposing the penalty is not, in fact, fair) (quoting F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Levels of
Arbitrariness in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18
U.C.D. L. REV. 1113, 1162 (1985)).
7. See infra note 143-144 and accompanying text.
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Penn Central summarized the lack of a substantive test for identifying
a taking as follows:
The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable diffi-
culty.  While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amend-
ment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” this Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for deter-
mining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. In-
deed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restric-
tion will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for
any losses proximately caused by it depends largely “upon the par-
ticular circumstances [in that] case.”8
In lieu of a test, Penn Central identifies several factors that are to be
considered in an ad hoc balancing approach:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s
decisions have identified several factors that have particular signifi-
cance.  The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations.  So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.9
Neither the recognition of the lack of a “set formula” nor the
adoption of the ad hoc balancing approach reflects a lack of effort10 or
8. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
9. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
10. "Thousands of square miles of our nation have been deforested to provide the paper to
print the thousands—probably hundreds of thousands—of books, articles, notes, comments,
seminar papers, newsletters, etc., dealing with regulatory takings."  Julian Conrad Juer-
gensmeyer, Florida's Private Property Rights Protection Act: Does It Inordinately Burden the
Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 696 (1966); see also CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION 49 (1994) ("Scholars have joined judges in spilling a great deal of ink over tak-
ings . . . .").  The scale of the scholarly effort is reflected by the following: A WestLaw Keycite
search in April 2003 for Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), indicates
3394 citations, of which, 859 were cases or other official legal authority and 2535 were secondary
sources including articles and briefs.  There were 4067 citations of Penn Central in March 2003.
Of these, 1446 were cases or other official legal authority and 2621 were secondary sources or
briefs.
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intelligence11 on the part of judges and scholars.  Instead, the adoption
of the Penn Central balancing test should be viewed as a pragmatic
acceptance of the problems that result from the complexity of the is-
sues and the diversity of the circumstances involving regulation.12
This complexity is reflected in the diversity of issues that the Supreme
Court has addressed in its regulatory taking cases, which include
zoning,13 environmental schemes,14 restrictions on landlords,15 and
prohibitions on business activities.16
Despite such complexity, it might be possible to develop a set of
clear rules if there were an accepted standard of property rights that
could be used to determine when land use is improperly limited.
However, there is no such standard.17  To the extent there has been
agreement, the standards are too vague to provide a predictable test
for distinguishing regulatory takings from other regulatory actions
under the police power.  For example, the common law relied on a
shared view about limiting “harm to others”18 in adopting the “rule”
that the right to use land is subject to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut ali-
11. "The judges and scholars who have addressed the issue in the twentieth century are as
intelligent a group as is likely to address it in the twenty-first.  The takings issue is muddy be-
cause it is inherently hard to deal with, not because the people who have addressed it haven't
been smart enough to see the light."  WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 325 (1995).
12. For a more complete discussion of these problems see, for example, F. Patrick Hub-
bard, "Takings Reform" and the Process of State Legislative Change in the Context of a "Na-
tional Movement," 50 S.C. L. REV. 93, 97-106 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (upholding application of historic preservation ordi-
nance); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (striking down application of zoning
ordinance on due process grounds); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upholding zoning scheme as a valid exercise of authority to protect the public health and wel-
fare).
14. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that
where environmental regulation destroys all economic value, there has been a taking).
15. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (holding that a rent-control or-
dinance for mobile home parks was not a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a requirement that landlords allow installation of cable
television was a taking); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that a taking
claim was premature, but noting that rent control was not necessarily a taking).
16. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding prohibition of manufacture
or sale of alcohol); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding rezoning that pro-
hibited brick manufacture at a designated location as a valid exercise of police power); Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding injunction and ordinance against a
gravel pit).
17. For a critique of recent "objective" formulations by the Supreme Court see Hubbard,
supra note 5, at 489-91, 517-18.
18. This agreement underlies the continued appeal of John Stewart Mills' classic essay, ON
LIBERTY (1859).
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enum non lædas (“One should use his own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another).”19  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n
v. DeBenedictis20 expresses the role of this principle in takings law as
follows:
Long ago it was recognized that “all property in this country is held
under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be
injurious to the community,” and the Takings Clause did not trans-
form that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the
State asserts its power to enforce it.21
Such maxims concerning harm to others have been widely recognized
as vague and question-begging because they do not provide guidance
until one answers the question: What is a harm?22 Because there is no
objective answer to this question, maxims like sic utere cannot help us
determine whether an owner has a “right” to a use that may be taken
by a regulatory limit on that use.23
Regulatory takings are further complicated by several types of
“denominator problems,” which arise whenever one wants to deter-
mine the extent of the impact of a regulation on the owner’s rights.
An example of the first type of problem arises when a parcel is re-
zoned from commercial to residential.  Has the owner suffered a “to-
tal” loss of his right to use the land for commercial use or a “partial”
loss of one among many possible uses of the land?24  In terms of frac-
tional analysis, the numerator in this example is the loss of commer-
cial use, and  the issue is whether the denominator is commercial use
alone or all possible uses.  The second type of denominator problem
arises from the ability to subdivide land.  For example, if an owner
has a five-acre parcel containing one acre of wetlands, is the impact of
an environmental regulation prohibiting the filling of wetlands meas-
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
20. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
21. Id. at 491-92 (citations omitted); see also Northwest Fertilizing Co. v. Vill. of Hyde
Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-68 (1878) (stating that the restraint of nuisances through the exercise of
the police power "rests upon the fundamental principle that every one shall so use his own
[property] as not to wrong and injure another. . . .  'Every right, from absolute ownership in
property down to a mere easement, is purchased and holden subject to the restriction that it
shall be so exercised as not to injure others.'" (quoting Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow.
585, 605 (N.Y. 1827))).
22. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50 (1964) (criti-
cizing "noxious use" analysis on the ground that it is question begging).
23. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-1026 (1992)
24. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (phrasing denominator is-
sue in terms of rezoning from multifamily residential to single family residential).  Such rezon-
ing is not treated as a total loss.  See, e.g., 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW
OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 6.05 (rev. ed. 2001).
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ured by using one acre (the wetlands) or five acres (the total parcel)
as the denominator?25  The third type of denominator is temporal.  If
a restriction is in effect for only a specific length of time—for example
a one-year moratorium on development—is the denominator that
year or some longer period—for example a “useful life of the invest-
ment”?26  The Supreme Court has been unable to develop a test to
address these denominator problems, and “. . . this uncertainty re-
garding . . . the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction has pro-
duced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.”27
B. Categorical rules
Though flexible enough to address the complexity involved, the
ad hoc balancing approach has serious shortcomings, particularly if
one is concerned with providing a predictable scheme to protect
property rights from “excessive” regulation.  In protecting other
rights, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the approach of us-
ing ad hoc balancing in favor of categorical approaches.28  In Lucas v.
25. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (recognizing uncertainty about the treatment of a
regulation requiring "a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state"); John E.
Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1535 (1994).
26. For further discussion of this point see infra notes 75-122 and accompanying text.
27. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
28. For example, the Supreme Court recognized the need for a clear, easily applied cate-
gorical rule in assessing the voluntariness of confessions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (holding that the case-by-case-
totality-of-circumstances test of voluntariness of confessions is not sufficient given the coercive
nature of modern custodial interrogation.  Miranda "laid down 'concrete constitutional guide-
lines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.'" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442)).
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) contains similar language concerning the importance
of clear rules in the context of Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has also emphasized
the problems with the ad hoc approach in applying the First Amendment to common law defa-
mation rules:
[T]he balance between the needs of the press and the individual's claim to compensa-
tion for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case basis. . . .  "[I]t might seem,
purely as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize
carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the final
judgment leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values transcend the le-
gitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who prevailed."  But this
approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could
render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable.  Because an ad hoc
resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we
must lay down broad rules of general application.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-344 (1979) (quoting Rosenblum v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  For an argument that there are important
reasons for differences in approach between speech and takings see Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scalia's Primer on Property Rights: Advancing
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South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court attempted to provide more
clarity and predictability in the takings area by identifying two limited
per se categories of regulatory taking.29  In Lucas, the Supreme Court
notes it has “generally eschewed any ‘set formula’” for identifying
regulatory takings and has, instead, engaged “’in . . . essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries.’”30 However, Lucas also asserts that, where real
property is involved,31 the Supreme Court has held:
. . . at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compen-
sable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced
in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that
compel the property owner to suffer a physical “invasion” of his
property.  In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions),
no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the
public purpose behind it, we have required compensation. . . .The
second situation in which we have found categorical treatment ap-
propriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land.32
At best, the per se categories in Lucas provide a “set formula” for an
extremely limited class of regulatory takings.  As an example of the
first type of per se taking, Lucas refers to Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.33 and asserts that Loretto holds: “New York’s
law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to em-
place cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a tak-
ing, . . . even though the facilities occupied at most only 1.5 cubic feet
of the landlords’ property. . . .”34 Loretto indicates that the physical
invasion test is limited to the permanent “physical occupation of a
portion of . . . [the property] by a third party.”35 As a result, this cate-
gorical limit has very little impact in terms of protecting private prop-
erty rights because the limit does not address a wide range of rules
that, for example: (1) permit nonpermanent invasions;36 (2) effectively
New Democratic Traditions by Defending the Tradition of Property, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 161, 199-204 (2000).
29. 505 U.S. 1003.
30. Id. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
31. See id. at 1027-28 (indicating greater protection for land vis-à-vis personal property,
which can constitutionally suffer a total loss in value without compensation).
32. Id.
33. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
34. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
35. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440.
36. See id. at 435 n.12 ("The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation
distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude.  Not every physical invasion is
a taking."); Id. at 441 (upholding "the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of
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require an owner to dedicate land and resources to a public use (for
example, building setbacks and landscaping requirements for parking
lots);37 or (3) require a landlord to install things like utility connec-
tions for tenants at his expense.38
The “total takings” test has also had very little effect as a cate-
gorical test.39 One reason for this lack of impact is the vagueness of
the test, and one source of such vagueness is the denominator prob-
lem discussed above.40 The Lucas opinion concedes that whether a
taking is “total” involves denominator problems and that the Court
has not identified a test for addressing these problems.41 Given this
lack of a test, “the rhetorical force of our ‘deprivation of all economi-
cally feasible use’ rule is greater than its precision. . . .”42 In addition,
property is a taking."  (emphasis added)); cf. Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
88 (1980) (holding that a shopping center must accommodate persons exercising their right of
free speech).
37. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding setback requirements chal-
lenged as a denial of due process and equal protection); Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a zoning ordinance requiring land-
scaping in surface parking lots was not a taking); Dailey v. Blaine County, 701 P.2d 234, 237 (Id.
1985) (holding that a setback zoning ordinance was not a taking); see also DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 9.11 to 9.23 (4th ed. 1997) (describing on and off-site improve-
ments, impact fees, and other considerations that municipalities may "exact" from builders).
38. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440.  The opinion in Loretto notes that, although the state was
required to compensate landlords for the physical invasion resulting from a regulation requiring
the installation of coaxial cable by the cable company in apartment buildings, it would be a "dif-
ferent question" if the landlord were required to install the cable for his tenants at his own ex-
pense.  Id. at 440 n.19.  The limited impact of Loretto is also reflected in the amount of compen-
sation received by the landlord.  See Id. at 437 n.15 (noting that state commission had
established a presumptive award of $1); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446
N.E.2d 428, 434 (N.Y. 1983) ("[Amount receivable by any property owner is small. . . ."); see
also Loretto v. Group W Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div. 1987) (denying Loretto's claim for
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on ground that Loretto had not applied for compensation
and, therefore, had not been denied constitutional right to compensation). But see Loretto, 458
U.S. at 438 (noting that arguments concerning value were "speculative").
39. See David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal Claims and
the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821 (1999); Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Tak-
ings Law, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 149 (2000); See also Hubbard, supra note 5, at 493-507;
Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-impact of the United States Regulatory Takings Cases on the
State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523 (1995);
Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other "Ex-
ceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the "Rule,"
29 ENVTL. L. 939 (1999).
40. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
41. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); see id. at 1054
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing that there is "no 'objective' way to determine what the
denominator should be"); id. at 1065-66 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing a lack of definition
of property interest that will serve as denominator).
42. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; see Hubbard, supra note 5, at 494-98.
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there are problems with determining whether an owner has lost “all
economically beneficial or productive use of land.”43 Finally, a total
loss of the economic value of the owner’s land is not a taking under
Lucas if the proscribed uses were never “part of . . . [the owner’s] title
to begin with.”44 Because of this caveat, the “total loss” category of
per se taking cannot be applied until after one has determined the
uses that were permitted prior to the denial of development under the
challenged regulation.45
C. Renewed reliance on the ad hoc balancing test
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Council46 and Palazollo v. Rhode Island,47 the Supreme Court’s most
recent regulatory takings cases, adopt the Penn Central approach
rather than the categorical approach to takings.
1. Palazzolo
a. Facts and Procedural History
In 1978,48 Anthony Palazzolo acquired title to property contain-
ing a large wetlands area as well as some higher land.  After the de-
nial of his second request to fill all or part of the wetlands, Palazzolo
filed an inverse condemnation claim in state court, alleging that he
had suffered a total taking because “the Council’s action deprived
him of ‘all economically beneficial use’ of his property. . . .”49 The trial
court ruled against Palazzolo,50 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed.51 The court held that the claim was not ripe because Palaz-
zolo had never applied for any scheme that did not involve substantial
filling.52 In addition, the court determined that Palazzolo had not suf-
fered a total taking under Lucas because the upland portion of the
land had a value of $200,00053 and because he did not acquire title un-
43. See Hubbard, supra note 5, at 485, 489-99.
44. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
45. For discussion of problems in this area see Hubbard, supra note 5, at 487-91, 499-504,
509-10.
46. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
47. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
48. The chain of ownership in Palazzolo is complicated, and the Supreme Court concluded
that Palazzolo did not acquire title until 1978.  Id. at 614.
49. Id. at 615.
50. Id. at 616.
51. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
52. Id. at 714.
53. Id. at 715.
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til after “the regulations limiting his ability to fill the wetlands were
already in place.”54 Given this chronology, the right to develop the
wetlands was not part of his title to begin with.  Finally, Palazzolo did
not suffer a taking under the Penn Central balancing test when he ac-
quired the property because “there were already regulations in place
limiting Palazzolo’s ability to fill the wetlands for development,”55
and, therefore, he had no investment-backed expectation of a right to
fill.  This lack of a right to fill was “dispositive of the case” and there
was no need to “consider the other factors of the Penn Central test.”56
b. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court held that the matter was ripe for review,57
but held that there was no total taking involved.  Palazzolo had ar-
gued that his situation satisfied Lucas because he had been left with
only “’a few crumbs of value’”58 when compared to his appraiser’s es-
timate that a 74-lot subdivision on the whole parcel would have a
value in excess of three million dollars.59 This argument was rejected
on the grounds that Palazzolo had not challenged the finding that the
upland parcel had a developmental value of $200,000 and construc-
tion of a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel would not leave
the property “economically idle.”60 His argument that “the upland
parcel is distinct from the wetlands portion”61 was also rejected be-
cause the issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari.62
54. Id.
55. Id. at 717.
56. Id.
57. Three reasons were given for this holding.  First, there was no doubt that Palazzolo
would be denied a right to fill any wetlands, regardless of how grandiose or minimal his scheme
might be.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618-22 (2001).  (Justice Stevens joined
the five-member majority on this issue.  Id. at 637-45 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).)
Second, possible dispute as to the value of any wetlands development that would be permitted
in light of other, unchallenged restrictions did not prevent the matter from being ripe as a tak-
ings issue.  Id. at 624-26.  Any dispute about the value of this development related to the deter-
mination of the fair market value of the wetlands, not to whether there was a final decision by
the Council.  Id.  Third, the value of the upland development was sufficiently settled for review
because both Palazzolo and the state had accepted $200,000 as the value for upland develop-
ment. Id. at 621-26.  (This treatment of the record in terms of the state's position was criticized
in a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 645-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).)
58. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
59. Id. at 616.
60. Id. at 631-32.
61. Id.
62. Id.  However, the Court noted:
This contention asks us to examine the difficult, persisting question of what is the proper
denominator in the takings fraction.  Some of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation
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The Supreme Court rejected the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
chronological approach63 to determining whether filling the wetlands
was ever a part of Palazzolo’s title and explicitly held that a takings
“claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the
effective date of the state-imposed restriction.”64 This chronological
approach was characterized as a rule that “[a] purchaser or a succes-
sive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-
enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a tak-
ing.”65 This rule would mean that “the postenactment transfer of title
would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action re-
stricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.”66 Such an
ability “to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause” could not be
accepted.67 Because of their approach to the effect of post-enactment
acquisition, the Rhode Island courts had not applied the Penn Central
balancing test to Palazzolo’s situation.68 Therefore, the Supreme
Court remanded the case so that Penn Central could be applied to the
partial deprivation suffered by Palazzolo.69
Palazzolo is clear on several points.  First, Palazzolo holds that
Penn Central, not Lucas, applies unless a total loss of use is involved.
More specifically, Palazzolo holds that a very substantial loss in value
will not be treated as a per se taking on the basis of the total takings
categorical rule.70 The loss to Palazzolo was substantial because, if
one accepts his assertion of the value of development ($3,150,000),71
effected by a regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as a whole; but we
have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule, a sentiment echoed by some
commentators.  Id. (citations omitted).
63. For a discussion of this test and the similar "notice" test see Hubbard, supra note 5, at
499-504.
64. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
65. Id. at 626.
66. Id. at 627.
67. Id.; see id. at 627-30 (noting that precedent and the effect of standing rules also sup-
ported the decision).
68. See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000).
69. Palazzolo, 535 U.S. at 632.
70. This treatment of substantial loss in value is consistent with prior cases.  See, e.g., Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992) (noting that "the landowner
with 95% loss will get nothing" under the total taking rule); Concrete Pipe & Prod., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) ("[O]ur cases have long established
that mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a
taking."); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384) (involving approximately
75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (involving 92.5%
diminution in value)).
71. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
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he would suffer a loss of 94% of the land’s value if left with a value of
only $200,000.72 Second, Palazzolo holds that whether the use at issue
was a part of the owner’s title to begin with will not be addressed sim-
ply by determining whether the regulation at issue was adopted be-
fore the owner acquired title.73 Thus, Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
per se rejection of Palazzolo’s takings claim was clearly improper.
Third, a majority of the Court takes the view that whether the time of
the acquisition follows or precedes the adoption of the regulation is
relevant to the determination of the owner’s reasonable investment-
backed expectations under the Penn Central balancing test.74
2. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
a. Facts and Procedural History
Beginning in the 1950s, residential development along the shore
of Lake Tahoe resulted in a deterioration of its exceptionally clear
water.  Without a halt in this process the “lake will lose its clarity and
72. See id. at 621-22, 630-31.
73. Id. at 626.
74. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy does not indicate whether the chronology of
acquisition vis-à-vis enactment is relevant to whether a taking has occurred.  Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion addresses this issue and asserts:
[T]he fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other than a re-
striction forming part of the "background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance") . . . should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restric-
tion is so substantial as to constitute a taking.  The "investment-backed expectations"
that the law will take into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction
that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.  Which
is to say that a Penn Central taking, . . . no less than a total taking, is not absolved by
the transfer of title.
Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Although three justices (Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Thomas)
are silent on the issue, Justice Scalia's argument is rejected by five members of the Court.  Two
justices (O'Connor and Breyer) argue that the sequence of acquisition and adoption of the
regulation is relevant to the determination of the owner's investment-backed expectations un-
der Penn Central.  Id. at 632-636 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).  A third justice (Stevens) argues that a party who acquires property after enactment is
"simply the wrong party" to bring the takings claim.  Id. at 637-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).  A fourth justice (Ginsburg, joined by Breyer and Souter, who is the
fifth justice), dissents on the issue of ripeness but notes: "If Palazzolo's claim were ripe and the
merits properly presented, I would, at a minimum, agree with Justice O'Connor, . . . Justice
Stevens, . . . and Justice Breyer, . . . that transfer of title can impair a takings claim."  Id. at 654
n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Given this agreement by five justices that whether an owner ac-
quired property after the enactment of a restriction would be relevant under Penn Central, it is
logical to assume that "notice" of the likely adoption of a restrictive regulation would be rele-
vant where the owner acquired title before enactment.  See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 315 n.11 (2002); Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-
Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 227-37 (1995).
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its trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for eternity.”75
“Or at least for a very, very long time.”76 In 1969, Congress approved
a compact between California and Nevada to address this problem.77
Efforts under this compact were not successful, and an extensively
amended compact became effective in 1980.78 This amended compact
had two provisions that are important to the takings litigation.  First,
the compact provided that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) would adopt environmental standards and a plan to imple-
ment these standards within 30 months.79 Second, the compact con-
tained a finding by the legislatures of California and Nevada of a need
for a moratorium on development and imposed a deadline on new
development until a new regional plan could be adopted or “until
May 1, 1983, whichever is earlier.”80 In order to comply with this leg-
islatively required moratorium, TRPA adopted Ordinance 81-5,
which temporarily halted a wide range of development effective
August 24, 1981.81 Although TRPA performed its “obligations in
‘good faith and to the best of its ability,’” it could not meet the 30-
month deadline of the compact.82 Therefore, it adopted Resolution
83-21, which continued the moratorium for construction in certain
sensitive areas until the new regional plan was adopted.83 The com-
bined effect of Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 was to impose a
moratorium for a thirty-two-month period from August 1981 to April
1984.84
On April 26, 1984, a regional plan was adopted, and suits were
filed immediately.85 The State of California objected that the plan was
75. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 308 (quoting 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (D. Nev.
1999)).
76. Id. at 308 n.3 (quoting 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231).
77. Id. at 309.
78. Id. at 309-10.
79. See id. at 310.
80. Id. at 310.  The compact noted: "[I]n order to make effective the regional plan . . . , it is
necessary to halt temporarily works of development in the region which might otherwise absorb
the entire capability of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the
ultimate plan." Id. (quoting Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. VI., 94
Stat. 3235, 3243 (1980)).
81. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir.
2000).
82. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 310-311 (quoting 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233).
83. 216 F.3d at 768.  Initially, the moratorium on Resolution 83-21 was for ninety days, but
was later extended until the adoption of the new plan.  Id.
84. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 312.
85. Id. at 312.
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not sufficiently stringent and immediately sought an injunction to bar
its implementation.86 Suits brought by the Tahoe Sierra Preservation
Council and by a class of individual owners of vacant lots objected
that the plan was too strict and sought, among other things, damages
for unconstitutional takings.87 The district court held that the thirty-
two-month moratorium imposed by Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution
83-21 did not constitute a taking under the balancing test of Penn
Central.88 However, the Court also held that the moratorium’s impact
should be viewed as a total taking for the 32-month period involved.89
Therefore, it held that the moratorium constituted a categorical total
taking under Lucas90 and ordered TRPA to pay damages for the tak-
ing.91 California was also successful because an injunction, which
barred implementation of the plan and included prohibition on new
development, was issued and remained in effect until a revised plan
was adopted in 1987.92  Both sides appealed.93
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction pro-
hibiting development but reversed the holding on the categorical
taking issue.94 The court held that the temporal denominator for ana-
lyzing the moratorium was not “the temporal ‘slice’ of each fee that
covers the time span during which” the moratorium was in effect.95 In-
stead of such “conceptual severance in the temporal dimension of
property rights,”96 the panel concluded that the “’use’ of the plaintiffs’
property runs from the present to the future”97 and that the morato-
rium “denied the plaintiffs only a small portion of this future
86. Id.  California sued on the same day the plan was adopted.  Id.  The day after California
sued, the League to Save Lake Tahoe also sued to enjoin the plan on the same grounds.  216
F.3d at 768.
87. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 312-13.
88. 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-42.
89. Id. at 1242.
90. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 316-17.
91. 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
92. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 312.  The revised plan also had prohibitions on
development in environmentally sensitive areas.  Id.
93. The district court had also held that the moratoria did not constitute a taking under
Penn Central, and the owners did not appeal this holding.  See id. at 314-18.
94. 216 F.3d at 788.
95. Id. at 774.
96. Id. at 775-76.
97. Id. at 782.
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stream.”98 The owners petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the
taking decision and certiorari was granted.99
b. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
An initial issue addressed in the majority opinion by Justice Stevens is
whether the takings issue before the court involved only the 32-month
moratorium imposed by Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 or the
broader prohibition resulting from the impact of the moratorium
combined with the effects of the District Court injunction and prohi-
bitions in the plan ultimately adopted in 1987.100 The majority held
that only the 32-month moratorium was at issue because certiorari
was granted to address only the 32-month moratorium and because
the later delays were caused by the district court injunction and by the
plan that was ultimately adopted.101
The majority opinion then addressed and rejected the owners’
argument that any “temporary deprivation—no matter how brief—of
all economically viable use trigger[s] a per se rule that a  taking has
occurred.”102 Such a requirement of “compensation for every delay in
the use of property would render routine government processes pro-
hibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking.”103 There-
fore, the Court held that “whether a temporary moratorium effects a
taking . . . depends upon the particular circumstances of the case.”104
The Court resisted “’[t]he temptation to adopt . . . per se rules . . .’”
and concluded “that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed
within the Penn Central framework” with its “’essentially ad hoc fac-
tual inquiries’ . . . designed to allow ‘careful examination and weigh-
ing of all the relevant circumstances.’”105 Categorical rules are appro-
priate, but only where “the government physically takes possession of
an interest in property for some public purpose. . . .”106
98. Id.
99. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948 (2001).
100. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 306-7.
101. Id. at 306-07, 310-14, 314 n.8.
102. Id. at 320.
103. Id. at 335.
104. Id. at 321; see id. at 335-37.
105. Id. at 321-322 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
106. Id. at 322-23.  Justice Stevens indicates that his scheme of a categorical rule for physical
takings of an interest in property and ad hoc balancing for regulations of uses is based on the
longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one hand, and
regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other. . . . Id. at 324.  The utility of this distinction as
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In applying the ad hoc balancing test of Penn Central, the impact
on an owner’s interest is done by reference to the “’parcel as a
whole’.”107 Under this approach, it is improper to “sever a 32-month
segment from the remainder of each landowner’s fee simple estate,
and then ask whether that segment has been taken in its entirety by
the moratoria.”108 Such severance is improper because “defining the
property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being chal-
lenged is circular” because this approach would mean that “every
delay would become a total ban; [and] the moratorium and the nor-
mal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings.”109 Be-
cause of the need to consider the total temporal impact of a regula-
tion, “a permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is
a taking of ‘the parcel as a whole,’ whereas a temporary restriction
that merely causes a diminution in value is not.”110 Temporary mora-
toria may reduce the value of land, but it will not “be rendered val-
ueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the
property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”111
“’Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental deci-
sion-making, absent extraordinary delay, are “incidents of ownership.
They cannot be considered as a ‘taking’ in the constitutional
sense.”’”112
In addition to rejecting the categorical rule that would treat all
delays in development as a taking, Justice Stevens considered and
rejected six other possible theories that would support a holding that
“considerations of ‘fairness and justice’ . . . support the conclusion
that TRPA’s moratoria were takings. . . .”113 Two of these alterna-
tives—defining takings by reference to restrictions rather than “nor-
mal” delays or by reference to a short fixed period—are rejected on
the grounds that they would “impose serious financial constraints on
the planning process”114 that “may force officials to rush through the
a guide for regulatory takings is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., id. at 349-51
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the application of the framework to the moratorium at
issue).
107. Id. at 327, 331 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31).
108. Id. at 331.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 332.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) (quoting Danforth v.
U.S., 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
113. Id. at 332-33.
114. Id. at 333, 337, 339.
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planning process or to abandon the practice altogether.”115  In addi-
tion, the distinctions between moratoria and normal delays are ques-
tionable116 and fixed periods are more suitably adopted by state legis-
latures.117 The other four alternatives are: (i) a view of all the
prohibitions involved as a “’series of rolling moratoria;’”118 (ii) bad
faith;119 (iii) lack of legitimate state interest;120 and (iv) individual im-
pact rather than on a facial challenge.121 These are all rejected on the
ground that these alternative theories were not before the court.122
3. Discussion
Palazollo and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council clearly indicate
a shift by the Supreme Court from attempts to devise categorized per
se tests back to the ad hoc approach of Penn Central.  Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council notes “we still resist the temptation to adopt per
se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, preferring to
examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple ‘mathematically
precise’ formula.”123 The opinion also quotes frequently from Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement of Penn Central in her concurring opinion
in Palazzolo.  For example, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council notes
that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion “reaffirmed” the Penn
Central approach and quotes the following language from her concur-
ring opinion:
Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central it-
self and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings.  Un-
der these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations
is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.  Penn
Central does not supply mathematically precise variables, but in-
stead provides important guideposts that lead to the ultimate de-
termination whether just compensation is required.  The tempta-
tion to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must
be resisted.  The Takings Clause requires careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.124
115. Id. at 339.
116. Id. at 338 n.31.
117. Id. at 342 n.37.
118. Id. at 333; see supra note 102 and accompanying text for a rejection of this view by the
majority.
119. Id. at 333-34.
120. Id. at 334.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 326.
124. Id. at 326 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-4, 636 (2001) (O'-
Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted)).
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Part of the reason for the renewed concern for balancing the im-
pact on the owner against the public interest is that Palazzolo and
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council also constitute a shift from “regu-
lator bashing” to an endorsement of “good” planning.  Examples of
“bashing” are found in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas,
which asserts that government has a natural tendency to use the po-
lice power to eliminate private property and engage in “plundering”
and that the harm principle would not be an effective limit unless the
legislature had a “stupid staff.”125 In contrast, Justice Stevens’ opinion
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council discusses examples of “bad”
planning, including bad faith and lack of legitimate state interest, but
notes that none was involved in the two TRPA moratoria at issue.126
Instead, the opinion stresses the environmental importance of the wa-
ter quality of Lake Tahoe, the need for a comprehensive regional
plan to protect the lake, and that delays in adopting a plan resulted
“[d]espite the fact that TRPA performed [its] obligations in ‘good
faith and to the best of its ability.’”127 In addition, Justice Stevens
notes that broad moratoria are fair because “with a temporary ban on
development there is a lesser risk that individual owners will be ‘sin-
gled out’ to bear a special burden that should be shared by the public
as a whole.”128 Finally, Justice Stevens views moratoria as “an essen-
tial tool of successful development” because they enable a planning
agency to “make well-reasoned decisions” and “obtain the benefit of
comments and criticisms from interested parties . . . during its delib-
125. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 1025 n.12, 1027 n.14
(1992). Justice Scalia uses similar language in other opinions.  See, e.g., Nollan v. CA. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (referring to regulatory conditions as "'an out-and-out plan of
extortion'") (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981). For other
discussions of "regulator bashing" see Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1755, 1764 (1988) (arguing that pro-owner decisions tell stories of
"abuse of regulatory power and manipulation of powerless landowners", of "regulatory extor-
tion", and of "regulatory manipulation and virtual deceit"); William W. Fisher, III, The Trouble
with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1408-1409 (1993) (noting attacks by Justice Scalia in Lucas
and other opinions); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1411, 1419-1420 (1993) (arguing that the majority in Lucas felt that regulatory actions were re-
sulting in [such] "horrible" action and that a "win" for a landowner was needed).
126. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 333-34.
127. Id. at 307-11 (quoting 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233), id. at 339.  Justice Stevens has consis-
tently held a pro-regulation position.  See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 339-40 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 341 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987)).
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erations.”129 Justice Stevens’ opinion is also more positive about the
ability of land use regulations to result in “givings” as well as takings.
[W]ith a moratorium there is a clear “reciprocity of advantage,” be-
cause it protects the interests of all affected landowners against
immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the plan that is ultimately adopted.  “While each of us is
burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly
from the restrictions that are placed on others.”  In fact, there is
reason to believe property values often will continue to increase de-
spite a moratorium. . . . Such an increase makes sense in this con-
text because property values throughout the Basin can be expected
to reflect the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain in its
pristine state.130
An additional indication of the renewed importance of Penn
Central is the lack of a workable categorical rule in the dissenting
opinions in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, which is joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, argues that there is a taking because the Court should con-
sider the combined effect of the 32 month moratorium and the subse-
quent court injunction131 and that this broader “moratorium” lasted
“nearly six years.”132 Though “property rights are enjoyed under an
‘implied limitation,’”133 this broader “moratorium prohibiting all eco-
nomic use for a period of six years is not one of the longstanding im-
plied limitations of state property law.”134 “[T]he prohibition on de-
velopment of nearly six years in this case cannot be said to resemble
any ‘implied limitation’ of state property law and is, therefore, a tak-
ing that requires compensation.”135
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is based on his disagreement as
to the length of the “moratorium” at issue rather than on a disagree-
ment about the applicability of Penn Central.  Rehnquist does not of-
fer a categorical rule for moratoria because it is his view that “[t]his
case does not require us to undertake a more exacting study of state
property law and discern exactly how long a moratorium must last be-
fore it no longer can be considered an implied limitation of property
129. Id. at 337-38, 340.
130. Id. at 341 (citations omitted) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922),
and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)).
131. Id. at 343-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 354.
133. Id. at 351 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413).
134. Id. at 352.
135. Id. at 354.
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ownership . . . .”136 Though Rehnquist notes that normal permit delays
and “ordinary moratoria,” perhaps as long as two years, may be le-
gitimate,137 neither the definition nor the permissibility of “ordinary
moratoria” is addressed.  Instead, he avoids these issues because of
his view that “this case does not require us to decide as a categorical
matter whether moratoria prohibiting all economic use are an implied
limitation of state property law. . . .”138 Thus, Rehnquist’s dissent pro-
vides no guidance, much less a categorical rule, on how to address
moratoria. Instead, his “test” is that he knows a taking by moratorium
when he sees it; and he sees it in this moratorium, which he views as
lasting six years.139
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, does offer a categorical
rule, but this rule is so extreme that it is hard to believe that a major-
ity of the Court would ever adopt it.  Thomas “would hold that regu-
lations prohibiting all productive uses of property are subject to Lu-
cas’s per se rule, regardless of whether the property so burdened
retains theoretical useful life and value if, and when, the ‘temporary’
moratorium is lifted.”140 With such a broad rule, many instances of
delay involved in getting a permit to develop vacant land would be
considered a taking.  For example, the land in Lucas apparently had
no productive use unless a structure like a house was placed on it.
Eventually, a house for this site was approved.141 The delay in getting
a building permit for that house would apparently constitute a taking
under Thomas’s clear categorical rule.  The taking caused by such a
short delay might not have much impact on the value of the land, but
under this per se approach “value bears on the amount of compensa-
tion due and has nothing to do with the question whether there was a
taking in the first place.”142
136. Id. at 353 n.4.
137. Id. at 351-54. The two year time period is from the Minnesota scheme, which is in-
cluded in a list of state legislative time limits on moratoria.  The sentence following the listing
notes that ". . . it has long been understood that moratoria on development exceeding these
short time periods are not a legitimate planning device."  Id. at 354.
138. Id. at 353.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 209-10 (2d ed. 2000).
142. Id.
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II.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS OF REVIEW OF RANDOM SAMPLE OF
CASES CITING PENN CENTRAL
In order to reduce the subjectivity that occurs when cases are
selected to address an issue or to illustrate a point, a random selection
of cases citing Penn Central was examined.  The cases were selected
on August 23, 2002 by using the Westlaw Keycite feature to generate
a list of all the cases citing Penn Central.  One hundred and thirty-
three cases (one-tenth of the 1329 cases citing Penn Central) were se-
lected randomly and reviewed.143 A copy of the review sheet used for
this process is included as Appendix 1 to this article.  Appendix 2 con-
tains a tabular summary of some of the results.
A. Rates of Success and Reported Decisions
As the tabular summary indicates, the merits of the taking claims
were addressed in eighty-two of these cases.  Owners prevailed in
eleven of these eighty-two cases.  Thus, owners prevailed in 13.4% of
the cases where the merits were addressed and in 9.8% of all one
hundred and thirty-three cases.  By themselves, these low success
rates do not indicate unfairness because there are circumstances
where it would be rational to incur litigation costs even if the odds of
success were low.  For example, where potential awards are high or
where you can spread the costs across other litigation or claims or
among other owners, it is rational to litigate even where it is known
that the chance of success is low.  In such situations, a low success
rate, by itself, does not indicate unfairness.
A review of the seventy-one cases in which the owners lost indi-
cates circumstances where it is rational for owners to litigate in a
scheme in which they lose far more often than they win.  Sixty-four of
these seventy-one cases where the owners lost involved situations
where the rewards of success were very high and/or litigation costs
were reduced because of one or a combination of the following: (1) a
very substantial amount of money (vis-à-vis litigation costs) was at
stake; (2) an owner was a “repeat player” interested in the financial
impact of a regulatory scheme in future situations; (3) a group was
sharing litigation costs; or (4) multiple claims were involved so that
the takings claim by itself was, to some extent, only a small portion of
the litigation costs.  In addition, there was a possibility of recovering
attorney fees in the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §  1983, and a
143. The selection was done by using a random number table to select a case from the first
ten cases on the list.  Every tenth case on the rest of the list was then selected and reviewed.
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small number of claims appear to have been funded, at least in part,
by public interest groups.  Of the seven cases where these factors
were not involved, six involved at least one of the following: a cross-
claim by an owner, determinations that no regulatory restriction was
involved or that the plaintiff had no property interest of the owner at
stake, or the unsuccessful use of a takings claim as a defense to a
prosecution.  The other case appears to be a situation where a small
owner truly was, at least to some extent, litigating over a small
amount of money (or perhaps, the principle of the matter).144
The success rate of the Penn Central sample contrasts sharply
with a similar sample study of Lucas.145 In the Lucas sample, owners
prevailed under the Lucas total taking standard at a much lower
rate—less than 3% of the time.  However, in all the cases in the Lucas
sample, the Lucas claim was an additional claim added to the suit be-
cause the owners always had a potential Penn Central claim even if
Lucas did not apply.  As a result, it was inexpensive to add the Lucas
claim to the Penn Central claim, which would be brought anyway.
Because adding the Lucas claim did little to increase the litigation
costs already incurred in bringing the Penn Central claim, it was ra-
tional to add it even though the chances of success were low.  The dif-
ference between the Lucas success rate and the Penn Central success
rate clearly shows the importance of evaluating the rate of success of
a particular claim in terms of rational litigation costs.
Thus, it is difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of the success
rate data because the data are likely to be influenced by the rational
actions by owners—that is owners spend litigation costs where the
expected gains exceed the costs even if the chance of success is low.
This rational strategy could be employed in a system that is unfair just
as easily as in a scheme that is fair.  Thus, success rates do not directly
address arguments that current takings doctrine is inherently unfair
because the owners’ rights are always given too little weight.146 Be-
144. Goldberg v. City of Wilmington, 1992 WL 114074 (Del. Super. Ct. May 26, 1992). This
is an unpublished case in which the owner claimed that a taking occurred as a result of an ordi-
nance requiring owners to maintain trees on public property adjacent to the owner's property.
The court relied in part on authorities with similar maintenance requirements for public side-
walks. See id. at *2-*3; cf., Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute or Ordinance Imposing on
Abutting Owners or Occupants the Duty in Respect of Care or Condition of Street or Highway,
58 A.L.R. 215 (1929).
145. See Hubbard, supra note 5 at 506-07, 521.
146. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1993).
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cause owners are so likely to be rational in expending litigation costs,
the amount of weight given to owners’ rights might have little impact
on success rate.  For example, the success rate might be unchanged
over time if courts suddenly started giving vastly increased weight to
owner’s rights.  In response to any higher success rate resulting from
this increased weight, rational owners would simply bring more suits,
and a new equilibrium could be reached at the same percentage rate
of success.  The absolute number of successful suits would be higher,
which is an important difference, but the success rate would be un-
changed because more total suits would be brought.
One might argue that, even if we assume the success costs simply
reflects a rational litigation strategy, the sample data indicate unfair-
ness because so few cases are brought.  At the time the sample was
selected in 2002, only 1329 appellate cases were reported. This means
about fifty-five cases per year were decided over the twenty-four year
period since Penn Central was decided in 1978.  This figure is argua-
bly very low, even though these fifty-five reported decisions probably
reflect only a fraction of cases filed each year, because there are at
least tens of thousands of regulatory decisions affecting real property
occurring every year in zoning alone.147 On the other hand, it could be
argued that the low rate of appealed regulatory decisions simply re-
flects that owners have a high rate of success of having development
plans approved at the prelitigation stage in many areas of land regula-
tion.
This second view has some empirical support because studies
show that owners are very successful at the regulatory level.  For ex-
ample, a recent survey of zoning and development controls in South
Carolina indicates that owners have an extremely high rate of success
in terms of such things as rezonings (74% approval rate), variances
(76% approval rate), subdivision review (91% approval rate), and de-
sign review (90% approval rate).148 Studies in other areas of the coun-
147. See CENTER FOR COMMUNITY GROWTH AND CHANGE, LOCAL LAND USE PLANNING
REVIEW SURVEY REPORT 33, 33-4 tbl.E5 (Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://www.masc.sc/
Legislative/land_use_survey.pdf [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA LAND USE PLANNING
SURVEY] (indicating that nearly five thousand zoning decisions were rendered by local
governments in South Carolina in the years 1999, 2000, 2001).
148. Id. at 33 tbl.E5.  Because of such things as the inclusion of pending cases in the total
number of cases, the respective percentages of denials were: re-zonings – 16%; variance – 20%;
subdivision review – 2%; and design review – 4%.  Id.
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try indicate similar high success rates in zoning matters.149 The South
Carolina survey also indicates that decisions are made relatively
promptly and that very few of these decisions are appealed to the
courts.150
Because takings challenges are similar to an appeal from an ad-
ministrative agency, it is helpful to compare the rate of success for
such suits with the Penn Central success rate.  In terms of the federal
courts of appeals, the reversal rate for appeals from administrative ac-
tions was 7.9% in the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2001.151
The success rate of 13.4% for owners in Penn Central challenges
compares favorably with this rate of successful reversal of administra-
tive actions.  In addition, the low rate of success for administrative
appeals indicates that success rates are determined to a large extent
by rational litigation strategies.
Ultimately, the success rate data are inconclusive on the issue of
fairness.  Given owners’ concern for an efficient level of litigation and
given the high success rate of owners at the administrative level, it can
be argued that the success rate does not show that the Penn Central
approach is unfair in application.  However, the opposite conclu-
sion—that is that the data do not show the approach is applied
fairly—is also supported. As with the first conclusion, this opposing
conclusion can be supported by the likelihood that owners will adopt
efficient litigation strategies.  Because of this strategy, owners would
litigate at a rational level regardless of the fairness or unfairness of
the application of the balancing scheme.
B. Time Required for Decision
Takings doctrine is often criticized on the ground that it is ex-
tremely time-consuming to litigate takings cases.152 The survey data do
149. See, e.g., ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 141, at 330-31 (noting that numerous empiri-
cal studies have shown that zoning boards tend to grant between 50 percent and almost 90 per-
cent of landowners' requests for variances).
150. SOUTH CAROLINA LAND USE PLANNING SURVEY, supra note 147, at 25 tbl.D2; see id.
at 31 (indicating that of 6221 development applications of all types filed in 2001, only 31 appeals
resulted).
151. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS March 31, 2001, at 28 tbl.B-5 (2001).
152. Determining whether a taking has occurred is time-consuming for two reasons.  First,
given the lack of a set formula for identifying a taking, each case must be addressed upon its
particular facts and case-by-case adjudication takes time.  Second, to avoid being overwhelmed
with the task of reviewing legislative and administrative decisions, courts utilize the ripeness
doctrines to force the owner to receive a final decision by the regulatory agency involved before
seeking judicial review.  See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
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not support this criticism.  Of the eighty-two cases which addressed
the merits of a taking challenge: twenty-two were decided in two
years or less, nine were decided within three years, five were decided
within four years, and sixteen took more than four years.  (It was not
possible to tell the time frame for thirty cases.)  Most of these deci-
sions were final within the time period indicated because of these
eighty-two cases, only nine involved an appeal with a published deci-
sion.
These time periods fall within the time periods for litigation in
general.  For example, the median time between filing of a civil suit
and disposition by trial was 21.2 months for federal district courts in
the twelve-month period April 1, 2001-March 31, 2002.153 The time pe-
riods also compare favorably to the time required to resolve Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) brought by develop-
ers to deter citizens from challenging development schemes.  A re-
view of two of these indicated that the total time elapsed before
resolution by out-of-court settlement was, in one suit, eleven years,
nine months and, in the other, seven years, nine months.154
One basis for the claim of undue delay in takings litigation is that
ripeness rules, which require remands to regulatory bodies for a “fi-
nal” decision, unduly delay courts in addressing the merits until own-
ers have spent excessive time with regulatory agencies.155 One meas-
ure of the impact of ripeness rules is the ratio of cases addressing the
merit of a takings claim to the cases which do not address the merits
because the case is not ripe.  The survey data concerning this measure
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-94 (1985) (holding a takings claim not ripe because of the difficulty of
determining individualized impact of regulatory scheme, given that the owner had not sought a
variance).  There are good reasons for the ripeness doctrine.  See infra note 157 and accompa-
nying text.  However, the ripeness requirement can substantially impede judicial review because
land use regulation schemes are often flexible.  For example, a takings challenge to a denial of a
particular density for a residential development might be deemed not ripe because the owner
had not requested a variance.  Even with a denial of a specific request for a variance, the city
can argue that the owner should have sought a lesser variance or should have sought rezoning.
The net result may be that an owner spends time and money seeking a judicial determination
only to be told to go back to the regulators.  Because of possible delays like this, the ripeness
doctrine has been criticized.  See Max Kidalov & Richard Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the
Debate over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5-11 (1999); Mi-
chael K. Whitman, The Ripeness Doctrine in the Land-Use Context: The Municipality's Ally and
the Landowner's Nemesis, 29 URB. LAW. 13, 35-39 (1997).
153. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS, March 31, 2001, at 56 tbl.C-5 (2001).
154. Penelope Canan & Chris Barker, Inside Land-Use SLAPPs: The Continuing Fight to
Speak Out, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 5 (Mar. 2003).
155. See supra note 152.
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of impact suggest that ripeness rules may have less effect than critics
have asserted.
The Penn Central sample and the Lucas sample cases156 have
similar results concerning the ratio of cases where the merits were
addressed vis-à-vis instances where the cases were held to be not ripe.
In the Lucas study, forty-eight cases addressed the merits, and
twenty-one cases viewed the matter as not ripe.  In the Penn Central
sample, the numbers were sixty-one and thirty-four respectively.  If
the cases that consider the merits are combined with the cases that
view the matter as not ripe, the percentages of this total are as fol-
lows: in the Lucas sample, 72% of the cases address the merits, and
28% viewed the matter as not ripe.  In the Penn Central sample, 71%
addressed the merits, and 29% viewed the matter as not ripe.  These
figures do not necessarily indicate that critics are wrong in claiming
that ripeness rules unfairly prevent owners from addressing the merits
of a takings.  A remand in nearly 30% of the cases constitutes a sub-
stantial impact.
On the other hand, this impact may be justified because there are
good reasons for the ripeness doctrine.157 One reason is that until such
a final decision is rendered, it would be wasteful to review it, given
that the final result might be sufficiently different that no appeal or
impropriety would result.  Another reason is that until the agency has
rendered its final decision, the court has no case or controversy to
adjudicate; the agency’s final decision may satisfy the owner.  Conse-
quently, there are constitutional problems with review of a decision
before it is final. Given these policies, it is not clear that a remand
rate of nearly 30% is too “high” to be “fair.”  Nor is it clear that this
remand rate is sufficiently “low” to be fair.
In evaluating the issue of the time involved in addressing takings
decisions, it is useful to consider how much time is involved at the
administrative level. The survey of zoning and development controls
in South Carolina referred to above indicates that most decisions are
made within forty-five days and that rezonings, particularly those in-
volving planned unit developments (which are a more complicated
156. See Hubbard, supra note 5, at 521.
157. For discussion of the reasons for ripeness doctrine see generally DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 2.21 to 2.27 (4th ed. 1997) (chronicling ripeness and finality rules
in the context of takings litigation); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
3-10 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing ripeness doctrine).
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approach to zoning),158 are the only type of plan that typically takes
more than forty-five days, and these are usually done within ninety
days.159 This lack of undue delay at the administrative level indicates
that any criticism of delay must be limited to the judicial level, not the
administrative level.
C. The “Burden of Proof” and the Presumptive Fairness of the
Judiciary
Because the data on success rate and delay in decision-making
are inconclusive on the issue of fairness, it is necessary to address the
issue of “burden of proof.”  Is this burden on defenders of the fairness
of the balancing process or on critics?  A good starting point on this
issue is to consider whether there is any reason to believe that judges,
who do the Penn Central balancing, are likely to display a systemic
bias against owners as they balance owners’ rights against the public
interest?
In terms of the ideology of political parties, judges reflect both
Democratic Party and Republican Party values. For example, based
on the political party of the appointing president, the federal courts of
appeals judges applying the Penn Central balancing test have repre-
sented both parties in fairly balanced percentages over time.160 Thus,
158. See JULIAN CONRAD JURGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND CONTROL LAW 7.15-7.16, 7.18 (1998).
159. SOUTH CAROLINA LAND USE PLANNING SURVEY, supra note 147, at 35.  Only 2% of
all cases take more than ninety days.  Id.
160. The following is a percentage breakdown by year of the non-senior appeals court
judges by party of the appointing president:
YEAR NUMBER DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
1980 137 .64 .36
1981 134 .62 .38
1982 138 .58 .42
1983 140 .57 .43
1984 142 .56 .44
1985 158 .48 .52
1986 158 .44 .56
1987 157 .41 .59
1988 158 .41 .59
1989 146 .38 .62
1990 157 .34 .66
1991 153 .31 .689
1992 155 .28 .72
1993 152 .28 .72
1994 158 .34 .66
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to the extent that the politics of the judicial selection process is in-
volved, there is no reason to believe that judges have some political
bias against owners or against property rights or that bad faith is in-
volved in either the adoption or the application of the balancing test.
It is possible to argue that there is a prevailing cultural lack of
“proper” appreciation of the value of property rights and that, there-
fore, political party is irrelevant.  However, this type argument raises
fundamental issues concerning the basis of “objective normative
truth” about the “proper value” of property rights. A full discussion
of such issues is beyond the scope of this article.161 However, in a soci-
ety based on democratic values, cultural agreement on the impor-
tance of property rights, as reflected in decisions by politically ap-
pointed judges, is entitled to considerable weight.  For this reason, the
Penn Central approach should be viewed as prima facie fair, and the
burden of proof should be on those who assert that the judges are not
fair as they balance property rights against the public intent.
Because the data on success rate and time involved in litigation
are inconclusive on the issue of fairness, it appears that these data do
not assist critics in satisfying their burden of proof. In other words,
the data do not provide a basis for concluding that the Penn Central
balancing problem is unfair.
III.  Conclusion
Fairness is often in the eye-of-the-beholder, and it is impossible
to demonstrate definitively that the balancing test of Penn Central is
fair.  However, if one takes the view that the weight and scope of
owners’ rights are not absolute, but rather contingent on the situation,
then the ad hoc balancing test is necessary because of the complexity
of the circumstances involving regulation.  The process is also prima
facie fair because the judges applying the test are appointed through a
democratic political process.  Given the necessity for and the prima
1995 161 .35 .65
1996 151 .36 .64
1997 146 .39 .61
1998 150 .44 .56
1999 142 .46 .54
(Table supplied to authors by Dr. Donald Songer, University of South Carolina, Department of
Government and International Studies).
161. For a brief review of issues involved and of the importance of the cultural agreement
see, for example, F. Patrick Hubbard, Justice, Creativity, and Popular Culture: The "Jurispru-
dence" of Mary Chapin Carpenter, 27 PACIFIC L.J. 1139, 1141-1152 (1996).
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facie fairness of the balancing approach, the burden is on critics to
show that the approach is not applied unfairly.  The survey data do
not provide support for satisfying the burden.  Because the data are
inconclusive, they do not indicate that the balancing approach is un-
fair.  Thus, the Penn Central approach has not been shown to be un-
fair in terms of patterns of regulatory and judicial decisions.
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APPENDIX 1
Review of Sample of Cases Citing
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
Case Number: Review Dates: ___/___/02 by  ______________
____/____ Review Dates: ___/___/02 by  ______________
Review Dates: ___/___/02 by  ______________
Review Dates: ___/___/02 by  ______________
1. Parties
1. Affected party
1. Nature
1. Individual person[s]
2. Business[es] (includes associations)
3. Could not tell
2. Size
1. Small
2. Large (e.g., likely to involve more than 20
residential lots in size or More than
twenty employees)
3. Could not tell
2. Governmental unit
1. Federal
2. State
3. Local/regional
3. Other: _____________________
2. Court
1. Federal B which court
1. Traditional (Claims against state or local government)
1. Court of Appeals (Circuits 1-11, D.C. Circuit)
2. District Court
3.
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2. Claims against federal government
1. Claims Court
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
3. S.Ct.
4. Other: ___________________________
2. State
3. Program
1. Environment
1. Wetlands/flood plain
2. Coastal
3. Species (animal, plant) protection
4. Other
2. Zoning
3. Forfeiture/nuisance abatement
4. Other:___________________
5. Not a taking case
4. Taking issue addressed?
1. If so, circle this Ayes@ and address the following:
1. Was there a taking?
1. Yes.  If yes, was the finding of a taking based on
1. Penn Central
2. Lucas
3. Loretta
4. Other
2. No.  In determining that no taking occurred, was
Penn Central  test applied?
1. Yes
2. No.  In determining that no taking occurred,
what test was used?
2. How long did it take to identify (Measured by time
between last application date and date of decision in
the sample)?[Note that decision not necessarily final;
see 3 below.  Note also that appellate decisions (e.g.,
F.3d) take longer than trial court (e.g., F. Supp.2d).]
1. Not possible to tell
2. Two years or less
3. Three years
4. Four years
5. More than four years
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3. Appeals
1. Was there an appeal with a published decision
(before August 30, 2002)?
1. Yes
2. No
2. If Aa@ above is Ayes,@ did the appeal address
the takings issues
1. Yes, if yes, was the previous decision
1. Affirmed
2. Reversed.  If reversed, did the
appellate decision find a taking under
Penn Central?
1. Yes
2. No
2. No
2. If not addressed, circle this Ano@ and address the following
1. Concerning the role of Penn Central in the case:
1. Penn Central was merely cited as a general
proposition
2. Taking was at issue but held not ripe (or not yet
possible to tell if taking had occurred)
3. Other: _____________________
2. Appeals
1. Was there an appeal with a published decision
(before August 30, 2002)?
1. Yes
2. No
2. If Aa@ above is Ayes,@ did the appeal address
the takings issues?
1. Yes.  If yes, was the previous decision
1. Affirmed
2. Reversed.  If reversed, did the
appellate decision find a taking under
Penn Central?
1. Yes
2. No
2. No
NOTES ON APPEALS: (1)  No attempt was made to determine sub-
sequent history of published appeals of cases in the sample; (2) the
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category of Aappeals@ decisions does not include published opinion
in denial of petition for: (i) certiorari; or (ii) rehearing.
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Cases Citing Lucas v. Penn Central Federal Court
Traditional Claims against Fed. GoS. Ct Other Total
Ct. App. D. Ct. Claims Ct. US Ct. App. Fed
Total Cases 21 30 13 6 3 3 76
Parties Nature Individual 9 9 10 3 2 3 36
Business 15 21 6 3 1 3 49
Uncertain 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Size Small 9 7 4 0 2 0 22
Large 8 16 6 3 1 2 36
Uncertain 5 7 3 3 0 1 19
Governmental Unit Federal 5 7 13 6 0 3 34
State 3 6 1 0 1 0 11
Local/Regional 13 16 0 0 2 0 31
Other 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Program EnvironmenWetlands/Flood plain 0 0 4 2 1 0 7
Coastal 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
Species protection 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
Other 0 3 4 3 0 0 10
Total Environmental Cases 1 4 9 5 2 0 21
        Zoning 11 11 0 0 0 0 22
        Forfeiture/Nuisance Abatement 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
        Other 9 14 7 3 1 1 35
        Not a Taking Case 3 2 2 0 1 2 10
Taking  AddTaking founPenn Central 1 2 1 1 0 0 5
Lucas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loretta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
No Taking;Yes 10 17 2 0 0 0 29
No 0 2 4 1 0 0 7
Time to IdeNot Possible to Tell 3 5 0 1 0 0 9
Two Years or Less 3 11 1 0 0 0 15
Three Years 3 1 0 0 0 0 4
Four years 0 2 2 0 0 0 4
More Than Four Years 2 3 4 1 0 0 10
Appeal withYes Appeal AddAffirmed 0 3 1 0 0 0 4
Reversed uYes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Appeal did not Address Taking Iss 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
           No 10 16 5 2 0 0 33
Taking NotPenn Central cited as a general proposition 4 4 3 1 2 3 17
Taking was at issue but not held ripe 6 6 4 4 2 0 22
Other 5 0 2 3 1 0 11
Appeal withYes Yes: AppeaAffirmed 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
APPENDIX 2
